Behavioral Experiments in Health Economics.
When analyzing field data, such as survey or register data, researchers are often confronted with methodological challenges arising from lack of control of the environment where data is generated: ceteris paribus changes are rarely implemented in field settings, and the potential presence of unobservable variables or mechanisms such as self-selection makes it difficult to achieve causal inference with regard to direction and strength of effects. Despite these methodological challenges few studies in health economics apply experimental methods. Among the few are the three papers of this session applying experimental methods to acquire knowledge on the behavior of health care providers. The experiments are conducted in Germany and China. The focus of the first paper is on how the salience of the Hippocratic Oath changes how medical students trade off three quantities: their own profit; the payoff of a receiver (the patient); and the contributions of a group of payers. The second paper investigates systematically whether mixed payment systems are effective to reduce incentives to over- and under-provide medical services inherent in fee-for-service and capitation systems, respectively, and thus to improve patients’ health benefit. The third paper investigates to which extent prospective physicians’ decisions are sensitive to the type of payment system at work (either fee-for-service or capitation), and whether the sequence of different payment systems affects patients’ health benefit. Common to the three papers is that they contribute to a better understanding of provider behavior in markets for health care services.