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The Effects of Narrow Physician Networks: Evidence from CalPERS Plans

Wednesday, June 26, 2019: 8:00 AM
Lincoln 3 - Exhibit Level (Marriott Wardman Park Hotel)

Presenter: Samuel Moy

Co-Authors: Kate Ho; Robin Lee

Discussant: Rebecca McKibbin


The California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) manages the health and pension benefits for California state and local public employees. They contract with multiple health insurance carriers to manage employee health benefits and play a significant role in encouraging innovative payment reform. In 2008, Blue Shield of California, at CalPERS' bequest, introduced their NetValue plan as an alternative to their primary HMO product, Access+. In exchange for lower enrollee premiums, the NetValue plan featured a narrow physician network approximately half of the size of the Access+ network and an identical hospital network. We have access to de-identified eligibility and claims data for all CalPERS enrollees over the period 2004-2011. We use the data to investigate the impact of Blue Shield’s narrow network plan on enrollee selection, spending and utilization. The length of the panel allows us to include individual fixed effects, thereby mitigating the usual concerns about selective take-up of narrow network products.

We observe significant take-up of the NetValue plan among enrollees whose previously-chosen PCPs were included in the narrow network. However, changes in medical utilization and overall spending were small for these enrollees. The primary spending effects of the plan's introduction can instead be attributed to steering: enrollees who switched PCPs in order to qualify for the narrow network plan generally moved to lower utilization/lower-priced providers. That is, lower spending was primarily driven by lower capitation rates paid to NetValue physician groups relative to other providers. There is also an economically significant but noisy effect on spending attributable to use of cheaper hospital facilities, which may be due to lower-priced provider groups having affiliations with lower-priced hospitals. The lower capitation payment rates offered by physician groups in the narrow network seem to be partly due to lower utilization. We find mixed evidence regarding cross-provider differences in the quality metrics collected by the state. There is substantial heterogeneity in all of these effects across markets.

In addition to these static differences across providers, we find some evidence that the exclusion of higher priced providers led to lower growth in capitation rates for providers included in the narrow network. However, these effects are small, perhaps due to the fact that relatively few enrollees actively switched providers in order to obtain the premium savings. Finally, a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the premium savings due to enrollment in the NetValue plan are comparable in magnitude to the savings due to steering toward cheaper providers, suggesting that CalPERS enrollees are the primary beneficiaries of spending reductions.