Superstar Surgeons: the Effect of Reputation on Surgeon Behavior and Patient Demand

The effectiveness of leveraging consumer choices to improve health care quality depends on the sensitivity of market responses to not only clinical quality but also to other provider characteristics, such reputation. Using data on "top doctor" awards granted by third-party firms, I study the effect of a reputation gain exogenous to the underlying clinical quality in the Medicare Fee-for-service (FFS) market. I examine three types of outcomes to access the response of patient demand and provider behavior to "top doctor" awards: patient volume, patient composition, and surgeon practice settings. I find that a "top doctor" award led to a 20 percent increase in Medicare FFS outpatient volume for orthopedic surgeons. There is no effect of award-winning on Medicare FFS inpatient volume for any of the seven surgical specialties in my sample, and there is little evidence that award-winning changed the share of a surgeon's patients who traveled from far-away or who were medically complex. I also find that winning a "top doctor" award more than doubled the likelihood that a cardiac surgeon or an orthopedic surgeon practiced at a specialty hospital. Overall, the results suggest that demand responses to "top doctor" awards are modest in the Medicare FFS market but likely exists in other markets. Future research will examine the effect of reputation on prices and network inclusion in the privately insured market.